Supreme Court affirms that marital dissolution case survives even if a party doesn’t

The August 3, 2022, Supreme Court decision in Seels v. Smalls, 437 S.C. 167, 877 S.E.2d 351 (2022), affirmed that a marital dissolution action survives the death of a party.  In Seels, Wife filed a separate maintenance action in October, 2014, and died in December 2015.  Her brother moved to be substituted as a party and Husband moved to dismiss the case, arguing that matter had abated on Wife’s death and that only probate court could now address the parties’ property. The family court granted the brother’s motion and denied Husband’s motion, ruling claims for equitable distribution survived a party’s death.

At trial, the family court equitably apportioned the marital estate and denied Husband’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Husband appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari solely on the issue of whether a party’s death deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction to determine equitable apportionment.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It found that S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2) granted the family court “exclusive jurisdiction to …. to hear and determine actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, separate support and maintenance, legal separation, and in other marital litigation between the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in the actions in and to the real and personal property of the marriage and attorney’s fees, if requested by either party in the pleadings.” (emphasis in original).

It further noted:

The family court’s exclusive jurisdiction over equitable apportionment extends to marital property; it has no jurisdiction over nonmarital property. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) (2014). “Marital property” is defined as “all real and personal property [that] has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and [that] is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation as provided in Section 20-3-620 regardless of how legal title is held,” except for certain classes of property that constitute nonmarital property (e.g., inherited items, gifts from a party other than the spouse, property acquired prior to marriage, property excluded by contract). Id. § 20-3-630(A) (emphasis added).

Husband argued that S.C. Code § 62-1-302 provided the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The opinion noted that none of three areas of concurrent jurisdiction of family court and probate court applied to property division.

Husband attempted to distinguish the case of Hodge v. Hodge, 305 S.C. 521, 409 S.E.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1991), which held that a separate maintenance action seeking equitable distribution survives a party’s death.  He argued that the case in Hodge was in the appellate stage when the wife died.  He also argued Hodge was outdated due the changes to the equitable distribution statute. The Supreme Court noted Hodge relied upon the notion that wife’s interest in the marital estate vested upon her filing the separate maintenance action.  This vesting right is now part of S.C. Code § 20-3-610 which provides each spouse has a “vested” right in the “marital property.”  Finding Wife’s interest in marital property vested upon filing the marital dissolution case, it found the claim survived her death.

Almost twenty years ago, relying in part on Hodge, I wrote Family Law Issues When a Spouse or Parent Dies. I’ve assumed it was settled law that equitable distribution claims survived a party’s death and was curious why the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Seels. What I assumed was settled law is now even more settled.